Estimated time of reading: ~ 5 minutes

Euroscepticism is a long-standing phenomenon within the European Union, always linked to the complex dynamics between expectations and results that each member country has experienced in the process of accession and subsequently after joining the bloc. The big question that many European citizens have asked themselves in the face of crises of continental, if not global, scope is that relating to the guarantees that the EU is able to offer and how much this can be worth compared to the actions of the governments of the member states. The crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Moscow has had a very strong impact on European energy security and consequently on citizens’ wallets, as well as on the productivity of companies. It is therefore not surprising that the forces that promote Euroscepticism have used energy as a tool to create dissent within the EU. In particular, the Kremlin has taken advantage of its influence on far-right and far-left forces in Europe, as well as with ad hoc campaigns on social networks, conveying more or less explicit criticism of EU institutions, guilty of not thinking enough about the interests of citizens and of pursuing reckless political aggression against Russia. It is not surprising that Putin himself bet on Europe’s inability to give up its cheap gas during the winter, imagining that supplies through Russian pipelines to the European continent would continue despite the war. History has shown the opposite, with the vast majority of EU countries deciding to progressively give up all imports from Russia, with a few but significant exceptions. The main one is Hungary, a nation that has always been dependent on Russian gas and oil, also due to its landlocked geographical position, but which, under the government of Viktor Orban, has increased the importance of its ties with the Kremlin. Hungary continued to purchase Russian hydrocarbons, complaining about the excessive impact of sanctions on European economies and repeatedly calling for them to be lifted, while also promoting a negotiated solution to the conflict in Ukraine. Orban soon found himself isolated in Europe for his position, considered openly pro-Russian, but the election of Robert Fico as Prime Minister of Slovakia, in the autumn of 2023, guaranteed the presence of two leaders “close” to Moscow in the European Council, an element clearly not favorable to the decision-making process in Brussels. Other Eurosceptic forces have emerged in recent years across the European Union, supported at the local level by the populist and sovereignist wave as well as by the worsening economic effects of the numerous crises faced by the bloc, between the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, with the consequent increase in the cost of living. The rise of the Rassemblement National in France, Alternative for Germany, and other far-right parties constitutes a clear threat to the future stability of the EU, also in the perspective of energy projects, in particular in reference to the green transition. The hostility of many radical parties to the policies of relaunching renewables, with the push towards traditional sources, from coal to oil, seems more a favor to Russia than anything else, evidently lacking a long-term vision in relation to environmental sustainability.

Written by: Francesco Marino