Estimated time of reading: ~ 5 minutes

The current relations between the European Union and Belarus are clearly complex, due to the effects of the war in Ukraine and the general political contrast between Minsk and Brussels. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has traditionally been the dominant supplier for Belarus, accounting for the majority of Minsk’ energy imports. This dependence on Russia has made Belarus vulnerable to geopolitical pressures and fluctuations in energy prices, in the general context of the strong ties between Moscow and Minsk. In February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the steady support that Belarus gave and is still assuring to its main foreign partner severed the existing ties between Brussels and Minsk. Today, the EU imposed sanctions against Belarus, and this decision is, of course, affecting energy relations between the two actors. 

Historically, Belarus has also been a transit country for Russian natural gas and oil pipelines to the EU. This strategic location has given Belarus a degree of leverage for many years in its energy relations with the European Union, before the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine. While the EU has sought to reduce its reliance on Russian gas by diversifying its energy sources, including increasing imports from countries like Norway, Algeria, and Qatar, Belarus still remains an important player in the European energy landscape, for both geographic and economic reasons. 

The regime of Alexander Lukashenko has fully supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and this has led to the imposition of Western sanctions on Belarus, including measures aimed at restricting its access to international financial markets. These sanctions have had a significant impact on Belarus’s economy, including its energy sector. In response, Belarus has sought to strengthen its energy ties with Russia, including by increasing its dependence on oil and gas from its main ally. 

An important role in the EU-Belarus relations is the one played by the Baltic State and Poland. All these countries, especially the three former Soviet republics, have pursued a strategy of energy diversification to reduce their reliance on Russia. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have invested heavily in energy infrastructure, including the construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and the development of renewable energy sources. These efforts aim to increase the Baltic States’ energy security and reduce their vulnerability to Russian influence.

Still, despite their divergent energy strategies and the political fracture that emerged even before the invasion of Ukraine, with the highly disputed result of the Belarusian presidential elections in 2020 (part of the Belarusian opposition’s leadership still resides and operates in Vilnius), Minsk and the Baltic States remain interconnected through regional energy networks and infrastructure. The Belarusian energy grid is now integrated with the Baltic grid, allowing for the exchange of electricity and gas. Last July, the power grid operators of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed an agreement to decouple from the Soviet-era joint BRELL power grid with Russia and Belarus in February 2025, a dynamic that will obviously change the energy relations in that region of Europe. We have to remember that in 2018, after nearly a decade of negotiations, the Baltic countries signed an agreement to connect their power grids to the EU by 2025. At the same time, the European Union has committed a total of 1.2 billion euros ($1.3 billion) to prepare the region for decoupling, covering about three-fourths of the costs, as stated by Litgrid, Lithuania’s power grid operator. In the plans of the Baltic nations and their energy departments, the decoupling will take place on February 8 2025, when the Baltic states will synchronise the frequency of their grids with that in continental Europe, through a power link with Poland.

Written by: Francesco Marino